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Background: Over the past decades, the Burkholderia cepacia complex (BCC) has been
linked to multiple healthcare-associated outbreaks. No systematic analysis of these out-
breaks has been carried out to date. The aim of this study was to conduct a systematic
review of reports on nosocomial BCC outbreaks.
Methods: Published studies from 1971 until 9/12/2019 presenting nosocomial BCC out-
breaks were identified using Embase, Pubmed and abstracts from professional meetings.
Results: We identified a total of 111 outbreak reports. Thirty-two percent of the affected
institutions were academic hospitals and 43.8% community hospitals. The average out-
break duration was 198.6  604.4 days. A total of 240 deaths (10% of the 2390 case
patients) were reported but only 28 (1.2% of the 2390 case patients and 11.7% of the 240
deaths) were directly attributable to BCC. The source could be identified in 73.9% of the
outbreaks; 53.2% were caused by contaminated medical solutions and medications, 12%
were due to a contaminated disinfectant. In 28.2% of the outbreaks intrinsic product
contamination was reported. Multidrug resistance was noted in 26.1% of the BCC strains.
PFGE was the most frequently used typing method (43.2%) in the context of outbreak
work-up.
Conclusion: Medical products are the most frequent source of BCC outbreaks, repre-
senting over half of the identified sources, with 12% of the outbreaks caused by dis-
infectant products. Intrinsic product contamination was detected frequently, suggesting a
need for stricter regulation. While BCC-related mortality was low, our systematic review
revealed significant heterogeneity in both investigations and reporting of BCC outbreaks.
ª 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd
on behalf of The Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
The Burkholderia cepacia complex (BCC) is a group of non-
fermenting and oxidase-positive aerobic Gram-negativefectious Diseases, Bern
012 Bern, Switzerland.
(J. Marschall).
Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The
ivecommons.org/licenses/by-bacilli [1]. BCC is historically known as a deleterious patho-
gen in cystic fibrosis (CF) and chronic granulomatous disease
(CGD) patients. Although considered of low virulence in the
general population [2], it can cause serious illness in critically
ill and immunocompromised patients. Nosocomial infections
with BCC show no distinct clinical manifestation, and may
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the review process with identified citations.
Table 1
General characteristics of included reports of BCC outbreaks
Number of outbreak reports 111
Mean outbreak duration (days) 198.6 
604.4
Number of affected patients 2390
Number of affected hospitals 128
- Academic hospitals 41 (32%)
- Community hospitals 56 (43.8%)
- Hospital type not reported 31 (24.2%)
Overall fatalities 240
- Number of outbreak reports with data on
mortality
77 (69.4%)
- Number of deaths attributed to BCCa 28
Multidrug resistance
- Number of outbreak reports with data on MDRb 48 (43.2%)




- Number of outbreaks with ICU involvement 65 (58.6%)
- Number of outbreaks occurring exclusively in
ICUs
39 (35.1%)
a BCC ¼ Burkholderia cepacia complex.
b MDR ¼ Multidrug resistance.
c ICU ¼ Intensive care unit
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or septicemia [3].
BCC bacilli are commonly found in natural environments
such as soil, water and plants or in food [4]. Although they do
not grow very well in dry conditions, they have the ability to
survive for months in moist environments.
Over the past decades, several outbreaks involving BCC
were linked to environmental contamination, contaminated
devices and contaminated solutions such as chlorhexidine sol-
utions [5], mouthwash [6], moisturizing creams [7], inhaled
solutions [8] or ultrasound gels [9]. Nonetheless, no systematic
analysis of these healthcare-associated outbreaks has been
carried out thus far.
The aim of this study was to conduct a systematic review of
the scientific literature reporting on BCC outbreaks in order to
better describe how investigations were done, what causes
were identified and how these outbreaks were managed.
Methods
We followed the PRISMA statement when conducting this
study. In order to find studies presenting nosocomial outbreaks
associated with BCC, we used the databases “Embase” and
“Pubmed”, and reviewed conference abstracts from the
“Society of Healthcare Epidemiology of America”, the “Euro-
pean Conference of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Dis-
eases” and the “Infectious Diseases Society of America” up to
9/12/2019. Additional articles were added using the reference
lists from each retrieved report. The time frame regarding
publication ranged from 1971 [10] to 9/12/2019 [11]. Figure 1
summarizes the review process.
The following search terms and their combinations were
used: «Burkholderia»; «cepacia»; «Pseudomonas cepacia» (an
earlier terminology); «outbreak»; «nosocomial»; «healthcare-
associated»; and «hospital-acquired».
We included publications presenting nosocomial outbreaks
of BCC colonization and infections published until 9/12/2019.
Case reports, case series and reports on outbreaks outside of
healthcare institutions were excluded. Eligibility was assessed
based on the abstract.Relevant variables regarding publication, features of case
patients, characteristics of the outbreaks, investigations car-
ried out to find the source of outbreak, infection prevention
and control (IPC) measures taken and characteristics of the
bacterial isolates were collected. Findings were compiled in a
spreadsheet and transferred to a statistical package for anal-
ysis (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).
As this project required no access to protected health infor-
mation, no institutional review board was needed.
Since we did not find criteria for multi-drug resistance
specific for BCC, we defined it according to the criteria pro-
posed by Magiorakos [12] for the «Pseudomonas» category. BCC
was considered multidrug-resistant (MDR) when resistant
Table 2
Elements of investigation of the BCC outbreaks
Patient’s medical record 66 (59.5%)
Investigation on patient apart from blood cultures
(i.e., respiratory samples, urine, faeces .)
55 (49.5%)
Environmental investigation 66 (59.5%)
Medical product testing 101 (91%)
Medical devices testing (Bronchoscopes, anesthesia
equipment, .)
69 (62.1%)
Hospital department records analysis 30 (27%)
Investigation of medical staff (observation of
working methods, interview of medical staff,
staff screening samples, .)
59 (53.2%)
Review of IPCa procedures 40 (36%)
Case-control study to identify risk factors for
colonization or infection
21 (18.9%)
a IPC ¼ Infection prevention and control.
Table 3
Identified sources of the BCC outbreaks
Environmental source 9 (8.1%)
Medical device 19 (17.1%)
Medical preparation (including solutions, drugs,
disinfectants)
66 (53.2%)
eContaminated disinfection products 15 (12%)
Contaminated chlorhexidine 8 (6.5%)
Contaminated benzalkonium chloride 3 (2.4%)
eContaminated respiratory care products 11 (8.9%)
Contaminated albuterol 5 (4%)
eContaminated alcohol-free mouthwash 6 (4.8%)
Intrinsically contaminated products 35 (28.2%)
Extrinsically contaminated products 55 (44.4%)
Unknown if intrinsically or extrinsically
contaminated product
34 (27.4%)
E. Häfliger et al. / Infection Prevention in Practice 2 (2020) 100082 3against at least 3 classes of antibiotics. Bacteria described as
multiresistant without further information in the respective
study were included as such in this analysis.1 All BCC species were first described as P. cepacia. We kept P.
cepacia as an entity for the outbreak reports using this obsolete
nomenclature.Results
General characteristics of nosocomial BCC outbreaks
We included 111 outbreak reports in our analysis (Table 1;
Supplementary File 1). Twenty outbreaks occurred in Europe,
38 in North America (Canada and USA), 29 in Asia, 10 in the
Middle East, 11 in South America and 3 in Australia or New
Zealand. As a result of multi-institutional outbreaks, 128 hos-
pitals were affected: 32% were academic institutions, 43.8%
were community hospitals and for 24.2% institutions no details
about their structure were offered. A third of the affected
hospitals had  500 bed capacity, 28.1% had a bed capacity 
500, and no information about hospital size could be obtained
in 37.5%. ICU involvement was reported from 58.6% of the
affected institutions. Outbreaks limited exclusively to the ICU
occurred in 35.1% of the reports.
The total number of affected patients was 2,390. The
average duration of an outbreak was 198.6 604.4 days, with a
median duration of 93.5 days and a range between 3 and 2,661
days. Regarding mortality, 45.1% of the studies reported
occurrence of deaths. The total number of reported deaths was
240 (10% of 2,390 case patients). However, only 28 deaths (1.2%
of 2,390 case-patients and 11.7% of 240 deaths) could directly
be attributed to BCC.
A single article reported that cystic fibrosis (CF) patients
were affected by a BCC cluster. In 23.4% of the outbreak
reports it was made explicit that no CF patients were involved
and the remaining 75.7% contained no statement at all. No
chronic granulomatous disease (CGD) patients were mentioned
in any of the articles. A total number of 137 immunocompro-
mised patients were reported out of 12.6% of the publications;
seven publications reported no involvement of immunocom-
promised patients and 90 made no statement at all.
Regarding the assessment of bacteriological characteristics
“Pulsed field gel electrophoresis” (PFGE) was used in 43.2%,
“random amplification of polymorphic DNA” (RAPD) in 7.2%,
ribotyping in 6%, “multilocus sequence typing” (MLST) in 5.4%and “whole genomic sequencing” (WGS) in 2.7%. No bacterio-
logical typing was done in 4.5% of the reported outbreaks and
28.8% of the studies did not mention typing at all. Clonal
relationship of strains was proven positive in 52.2%, negative in
14.4% and remained undetermined in 32.4%. Due to the inclu-
sion of outbreaks where multiple BCC species were detected,
the total number of strains involved in this analysis was 121.
B. cepacia accounted for 43.8% of the strains, P. cepacia1 for
17.4%; B. cenocepacia for 12.4%; B. stabilis for 7.5%;
B. contaminans for 4.1%; B. multivorans for 1.7%; B. ambifaria,
B. pseudomallei and B. vietnamiensis for 0.8%. The species
identity of 10.7% of the strains was not identified.
Multidrug-resistant BCC strains were reported in 26.1% of
the studies. Non-resistant strains accounted for 17.1% of the
outbreaks and no information was given in 56.8%. Of the 240
overall deaths, 80 occurred during outbreaks caused by MDR
strains and 46 during outbreaks caused by non-resistant strains
(and there was no information for the remainder). Fifteen of
the 28 deaths attributed to BCC were linked to MDR strains and
four to non-resistant BCC. However, we recommend regarding
these results with caution. On the one hand, the analyzed
studies frequently failed to disclose the exact method of iso-
late testing. Moreover, the reporting of the activity of indi-
vidual antimicrobials was diverse, which made comparisons
cumbersome. In order to facilitate comparison between iso-
lates across studies, we recommend using CLSI breakpoints.Investigation and management of nosocomial BCC
outbreaks
Regarding investigation and management of outbreaks
(Table 2), 91% of the outbreak investigations concerned med-
ical products such as medications or disinfectants. Medical
devices such as bronchoscopes were tested in 62.1% of the
cases. Analysis of patient medical records was reported in
59.5%, environmental sampling in 59.5% and investigation of
medical staff in 53.2% of the outbreaks.
Table 4
Infection prevention and control measures taken during the BCC
outbreaks
Recall of incriminated product/cessation of
incriminated procedure
56 (50.5%)
Use of alternative product 25 (22.5%)
Working procedure adapted 29 (26.1%)
Cleaning/disinfection of ward/unit 23 (20.7%)
Enhanced infection control procedures 40 (36%)
Isolation of patients 11 (9.9%)
Notification of public health authorities 36 (32.4%)
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The source of the outbreak could be identified in 73.9% of
the cases and remained unknown in 26.1% (Table 3). The total
number of sources reaches 124 because of outbreaks linked to
contamination of multiple products. Fifty-three percent of the
outbreaks were caused by a medical preparation, with con-
taminated disinfection products accounting for 12% of the
outbreaks. Intrinsic product contamination was reported in
28.2% of the outbreaks. Contamination of medical devices and
environmental contamination caused 17.1% and 8.1% of the
outbreaks, respectively.
Infection prevention and control measures
Half of the reports mentioned a recall of an incriminated
product or cessation of an incriminated procedure. Enhanced
infection control procedures were explicitly reported in 36%,
and notification to public health authorities in 32.4% of the
cases. Isolation of patients was explicitly mentioned in 9.9% of
the reports. The infection prevention and control measures are
summarized in table 4.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic review of
healthcare-associated Burkholderia cepacia complex out-
breaks presented to date. We were able to elicit several
noteworthy aspects of the affected patients, their clinical
outcomes, the investigation for causes of an outbreak and the
outbreak management.
Identification of the outbreak source represents a keystone
when deciding about the most appropriate infection pre-
vention and control (IPC) response. In a quarter of the reported
outbreaks, the source could not be identified, emphasizing the
fact that the cause of a BCC outbreak can be difficult to elu-
cidate and depends on the thoroughness of the investigation. In
a review of nosocomial Salmonella outbreaks, Lee et al. [13]
found similar results with a non-identification rate of 21% of the
outbreak source. Regarding BCC, this could be either linked to
difficulties in identifying these bacteria in the laboratory or
due to their potential to colonize a large number of products,
devices, as well as the environment. This finding also highlights
the difficulty of establishing proper infection control and pre-
vention measures when the source is not identified.
On the other hand, we could determine that contaminated
medical solutions and medications were responsible for over
half of the outbreaks, with contaminated disinfectantsaccounting for 12% of the identified sources. Unlike MRSA
outbreaks where healthcare workers and patients play an
important role as source or vectors [14] our data suggest that
BCC outbreaks are actually less often associated with manually
contaminated environment (8.1%) or medical devices (17.1%)
but rather with contaminated products. Consequently, the
investigation of a BCC outbreak should always include medical
products. Furthermore, contamination-prone products should
be carefully reviewed in each affected department, in order to
avoid ongoing administration to patients.
Regarding environmental investigations, we recommend
applying a step-wise approach so as to be cost-efficient. Spe-
cial consideration should be given to water-related surfaces
such as sinks and faucets, as BCC tends to develop particularly
well in moist environments. Medical device investigations
should target respiratory care devices as BCC has a propensity
to colonize the respiratory system. Therefore, oxygen delivery
devices (nasal cannula, face masks), bronchoscopes and
anesthesia equipment should be scrutinized.
Intrinsic contamination was demonstrated in 28.2% of the
outbreaks, meaning that bacterial colonization had occurred
during the manufacturing process of the product that caused
the outbreak. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
contamination is crucial in the response to nosocomial out-
breaks, mainly because concerned manufacturers and institu-
tions should be warned as soon as possible in order to avoid
further infections by recalling the contaminated product.
Official notification allows the manufacturer to assess pro-
duction methods and improve the manufacturing process. Our
findings also highlight the issue concerning the lack of legis-
lation surrounding quality control and reintroduction of con-
cerned products, an issue recently addressed by Becker et al.
[15]. None of the analyzed reports specified what happened
after the recall of the product. It therefore remains unknown if
the concerned products were definitively removed from the
market or if they were reintroduced after modifications. It is
also unclear if the manufacturing process was assessed and if
contamination prevention at the production site was
enhanced. In Europe, there is currently no legislation for an
independent control mechanism and quality improvements in a
given production site are exclusively the manufacturer’s
responsibility [16]. Weaker enforcement of legal requirements
may lead to less thorough investigations and preventive
measures and, consequently, to more contaminations. We
strongly recommend the creation of legislation regarding the
control of manufacturing and reintroduction after the recall of
contaminated products with an independent third party, an
idea already formulated by Becker and colleagues [15] and
Sommerstein et al. [16] in recent years.
Only 77 of the 111 outbreaks reports disclosed data
regarding mortality with a total number of deaths reaching
240, which represents 10% of the 2390 case-patients. However,
mortality attributable to BCC revealed only 28 fatalities, rep-
resenting a mere 1.2% of the 2,390 case-patients and 12.7% of
the 240 deaths. Fifteen of the 28 BCC attributed deaths were
caused by MDR strains. In comparison, the mortality rate in
A. baumannii outbreaks may reach 47.1% and in P. aeruginosa
outbreaks 23.3% [17]. Campos et al. [18] reported a mortality
for KPC K. pneumoniae infections ranging from 27.8% to 66.7%.
The published data therefore suggest a rather low mortality
and indicate that the problematic aspects of BCC outbreaks do
not necessarily lie in the resulting mortality but rather in the
E. Häfliger et al. / Infection Prevention in Practice 2 (2020) 100082 5cost generated by longer hospital stays, the medical manage-
ment of affected patients and laborious outbreak
investigations.
Our analysis showed much variation regarding the quality of
investigation of the outbreaks. Based on the information
gathered from the reports, one can assume that a large part of
the outbreaks were investigated without use of standardized
infection control guidelines or a dedicated IPC team. This sit-
uation can lead to a delayed identification of outbreaks,
delayed implementation of infection control measures and
delayed identification of the source. In order to optimize
identification and investigation of an outbreak, we recommend
following national or international guidelines such as the one
proposed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) for outbreak investigation [19]. Furthermore,
the creation of an “outbreak response team”, which is a fre-
quent approach in academic hospitals, guided by pre-
established investigation guidelines, could diminish the dura-
tion of an outbreak, thus containing the costs.
Concerning the assessment of bacteriological character-
istics, we observed a great heterogeneity regarding themethod
of BCC typing. Although almost half of the studies used PFGE,
more than a quarter of the analyzed articles did not mention
the typing method at all, making it difficult to interpret their
ability to accurately identify the species. Identification of BCC
can represent a real challenge with a risk of misidentification
[20], especially with phenotypic tests such as those used in
readily available commercial systems [21]. In recent years,
whole genome sequencing (WGS) has been shown to have the
highest level of discrimination in identifying BCC species [22]
and we strongly advocate for its use. It is, however, a costly and
time-consuming technique used so far only in a minority of
laboratories, pointing to the need for an alternative if WGS is
not available. Fehlberg et al. [23] and Lambiase et al. [24]
analyzed the accuracy of MALDI-TOF in identifying BCC species
and described a good correlation with classical molecular
methods such as PCR, making it a sensitive, rapid and cost-
friendly alternative.
The most often cited IPC measures were recall of a prod-
uct, use of an alternative product, and enhanced infection
control procedures in terms of cleaning and disinfection.
Surprisingly, isolation of patients was explicitly mentioned in
only 9.9% of the reports; we believe this value to be under-
estimated due to a lack of explicit reporting. In order to
determine the size of an outbreak, identify additional carrier
patients and risk factors for colonization or infection, we
recommend conducting a case-control study, an approach
reportedly carried out in only 18.9% of the outbreaks sum-
marized here. Of note, our data also revealed that less than a
third of the institutions notified public health authorities,
probably partially linked to the fact that notifiable diseases
differ between countries. However, we suspect that a large
part of the publications did not explicitly mention this step in
their report. Nonetheless, involvement of public health
authorities, as recommended by the American CDC should be
one of the first measures taken in order to optimize collabo-
ration, activate contingency plans and avoid the risk of
nationwide outbreaks due to intrinsically contaminated
products.
A systematic review is by definition a post hoc analysis of
other authors’ reports. Therefore, the quality of the data
compiled in such an analysis depends on the quality of the workof other investigators. Our study revealed significant hetero-
geneity in terms of BCC outbreak investigation and the pre-
sentation of findings, making it difficult to develop a general
statement about the thoroughness of investigations. This het-
erogeneity complicates our analysis and limits the quality of
the results presented here. This particular aspect was high-
lighted previously regarding A. baumannii and P. aeruginosa
outbreaks [17]. Outbreak reports play a central role regarding
the investigation, infection prevention and control measures
and overall understanding of outbreaks and their dynamics. As
others have stated before, we would welcome a stand-
ardization of how outbreaks are reported in the literature in
order to optimize the quality of reported data [25]. The pop-
ularization of the Worldwide Database for Nosocomial Out-
breaks (www.outbreak-database.com) proposed by Lee et al.
could be a first step in this direction [13].
In summary, we identified more than 100 reports of BCC
outbreaks in the healthcare setting. Medical products are the
most frequent source of such outbreaks, representing over half
of the identified sources, with 12% of the outbreaks caused by
disinfectant products. Intrinsic product contamination was
detected frequently, suggesting a need for stricter regulation.
While BCC-related mortality was low representing only 11.7% of
the reported deaths, our systematic review revealed significant
heterogeneity in terms of both investigation and reporting of
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